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Proposal for Retention of the Louisiana
System of Fact Pleading; Expose
des Motifs
John H. Tucker, jr.*
The Louisiana State Law Institute, an official advisory law
revision commission and law reform and legal research agency
of the State of Louisiana, was instructed by the Legislature' to
prepare a revision of the Code of Practice. In the course of its
work on the preparation of the projet of the revision, the Council
of the Institute was squarely presented with the question of what
system of pleading to recommend in this revision. The adoption
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938) of a system of
pleading which has been called "notice" pleading brought into
sharp focus the arguments which had been made against the
system of "fact" pleading generally prevalent throughout the
United States. Therefore, in the discharge of its general purpose
"... to promote and encourage the clarification and simplification
of the law of Louisiana and its better adaptation to present
social needs; to secure the better administration of justice,"'2 the
problem of determining which of these two systems should be
recommended in the projet for the revision was seriously and
fully debated and considered in the Council.3
It well may be that the length of time devoted to the consideration of this problem has given it value disproportionate to its
importance. At an earlier date, when the pleadings were the only
instrumentalities to perform the functions of notice, formulation
of the issues and ascertainment of facts, the provisions for the
system of pleading were of tremendous importance. With adoption of the modern devices of pre-trial and deposition and discov* Member, Shreveport Bar; President, Louisiana State Law Institute;
Member, American Law Institute.
1. La. Act 335 of 1948.
2. La. R.S. 1950, 24:204.
3. The Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute is composed of
lawyers, judges, members of the Legislature, representatives of the executive
department and of the Faculties.
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ery, and provisions for liberality of amendment and other devices
bringing flexibility to the judicial process, the pleadings lose
much of their former functional character. Therefore, the determination of the system to be adopted is not nearly so important
as it was when the pleadings stood alone as the only instrumentality for these purposes, but it is indispensably necessary
that all of these functions be performed during the preparatory
period before trial in order to achieve the proper administration
of justice.
The Council of the Institute, after considering this problem
several months, and following a full dress debate, decided to
retain Louisiana's own system of pleading which is sometimes
called "fact" pleading, although it did not arise out of nor has it
ever exhibited all of the characteristics of the fact pleading systems of other states which followed the adoption of the Field
Code in New York in 1848.
At the same time the Council of the Institute instructed that
this paper be prepared in order to set forth the arguments which
had prevailed in the making of its decision to retain the present
system of pleading in Louisiana. The views herein expressed,
however, are not necessarily those of the Council in all particulars, but it is fair to say that the basic arguments made herein
were the same as those made at the meeting of the Council, with
necessary amplification and documentation.
The Reporter 4 in charge of the preparation of that part of
the projet of the revision relating to pleading, presented to the
Council three plans for the solution of the problem: (a) the
return to the simplified pleading under the Livingston Code of
1825; (b) the adoption of the notice pleading of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure; (c) the retention of the present system of fact
pleading. The Reporter recommended the return to the system
of pleading under the Livingston Code.
4. Professor Henry George McMahon, of Louisiana State University, is the
Reporter as well as the Co-ordinator for the entire work of the Code of
Practice revision. His Co-reporters are Professor Leon D. Hubert, Jr., of the
Tulane University College of Law, and Professor Leon Sarpy, of the Loyola
University School of Law, who is also an active member of the bar in New
Orleans. It is the practice of the Institute on work of this kind for the
reporter or reporters to make a preliminary draft, submit it to advisers
selected by the Council from the bench and bar and law schools, with whom
they subsequently discuss its provisions. Thereafter, a revised draft is prepared by the reporter and submitted to the Council for its consideration. If
there is a difference between the reporter and his advisers, both views are
presented to the Council. The draft by the Council is always accompanied by
commentaries and the reporter discusses with the Council the reasons and
the motives for his proposal.
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When confronted with a problem of this kind, the ascertainment of the objectives sought to be attained is of primary importance. This must be done with particular reference to the
conditions which now prevail and in the light of the other recommendations concerning pleading contained in the projet for the
revision. Proper consideration can be given to the plans proposed
only when there has been a correct ascertainment of these objectives, and a fair and full consideration of the circumstances in
which the system of pleading adopted will operate. In all of this
the Institute should not be and it has not been unmindful of the
general purpose for which it was created.
A law suit has always been an adversary proceeding and it
probably always will be. Judge Jerome Frank says that our mode
of trial is based on what he calls the "fight" theory, which derives
from the origin of trials as substitutes for private out-of-court
brawls. 5 He discusses this theory as being opposed to what he
calls the "truth" theory. By truth theory he means that the trial
courts, judge and jury, should "conduct an intelligent inquiry into
all the practically available evidence in order to ascertain, as
nearly as may be, the truth about the facts of that suit." He says
that many lawyers maintain that the "fight" theory and the
"truth" theory coincide because they think that the best way for
the court to discover the facts is to have each side try as hard as
it can in a partisan manner to direct the court's attention to evidence favorable to that side. He quotes Macaulay to the effect
that we obtain the fairest decision when two men argue as
unfairly as possible on opposite sides, because then no important
consideration will entirely escape attention. His conclusion is
that the "fight" theory has invaluable qualities with which we
cannot afford to dispense." A panoramic view of the jurisprudence of an appellate court, with a fair knowledge of the capabilities and character of the lawyers who argue the cases before it,
and the judges who write the opinions, will demonstrate that the
quality of the jurisprudence will vary directly with the ability,
character and industry of the lawyers who appear before the
court.
The trial being considered, therefore, as an adversary proceeding, the necessity for the adoption of rules for its conduct
5. Frank, Courts on Trial, c. 6 (1949).
6. Id. at 81. It may be said parenthetically that Judge Frank then
devotes considerable critical attention to the shortcomings of the bar, to
which the author cannot subscribe as being fairly applicable to the bar as
he knows It.
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which will keep the fight out in the open, give the opponents
equal opportunity, and prevent judicial ambuscade, is imperative.
In the preparatory period preceding actual trial, it is indispensably necessary that (a) the issues be formulated and simplified in order to prescribe the course of the trial; (b) the litigants have fair and full notice of the contentions of their opponents; and (c) that the facts, insofar as desirable, may be ascertained. These objectives of the preparatory period prior to trial
have been consistently recognized, but a great deal of confusion
has resulted from discussion of these objectives in relation to the
functions of the pleadings without properly evaluating the effect
of the adoption of devices other than pleadings, designed to
accomplish some of these objectives. The problem is one of
allocation of functions among these several procedural devices
so as "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action. '' 7 Any judicial system which does not provide
for the performance of these functions before trial will not accomplish these ultimate objectives.
Pleadings, being the formal written statements made to the
court by the parties to a suit of their respective claims and
defenses therein, have largely carried most of these burdens in
the past, in the systems which have prevailed in states other
than Louisiana.
In common law pleading special emphasis was placed upon
the issue-formulating function of the pleadings. At the same
time, it was necessary to bring a claim within one of the existing
forms of action, such as trespass and assumpsit, under penalty of
dismissal if the wrong form was used.
At the same time, pleadings in equity consisted in more
detailed statements of the contentions of the parties, with much
more flexible proceedings.
Under the earlier code pleading (Field Code of Civil Procedure, N.Y. 1848), emphasis was placed upon disclosing the
material, ultimate facts, and less stress was placed upon the
function of formulation of issues. In code pleading, equity and
law were fused in one civil action. These codes borrowed greatly
from the equity practice.
The modern view expressed by common law doctrinaires is
that the pleadings should give fair notice of the pleader's case to
the opposing party and to the court.
7. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.

19531

RETENTION OF PRESENT PLEADING

Roscoe Pound, and his committee of the American Bar
Association, in reporting on a bill in Congress some years ago
concerning practice in the federal courts said that the four purposes of pleadings are:
(1)

To serve as the formal basis for the judgment.

(2)

To separate issues of fact and law.

(3)

To give litigants the advantage of a plea of res adjudicata if molested again for the same cause.

(4)

To notify parties of the claims, defenses and crossdemands of their adversaries.

He said that the notice function is the one that should be
emphasized, that the purpose of forming the basis of the judgment should be abandoned, and that the other functions should
be as well performed as of the time at which he wrote (1910), if
the notice function was thoroughly developed and consistently
adhered to."
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it has been
said that "notice" pleading has been adopted, and "fact" pleading
abandoned, and that the function of formulation of the issues
(the objective of common law pleading) has been transferred to
the pre-trial conference, with the accessory procedures for discovery and deposition largely performing the function of ascertaining the material facts (the principal objective of code pleading).
The objective or function of the pleadings under the Federal
Rules has been defined by James William Moore in this manner:
"The courts have recognized that the function of pleadings
under the Federal Rules is to give fair notice of the claim
asserted so as to enable the adverse party to answer and
prepare for trial, to allow for the application of the doctrine
of res judicata, and to show the type of case brought, so that
it may be assigned to the proper form of trial."9
In Louisiana the basic objectives of pleading have remained
unchanged since Livingston's Practice Act of 1805.10 In an early
case they were thus described:
"All it requires is, that each party should allege his grounds
8. 35 A.B.A.R. 638 (1910).
9. 2 Moore, Federal Practice 1648, 1649 (2 ed. 1948).
10. Act of April 10, 1805, c. 26, 2 Martin, Digest of the Acts of Louisiana
155 (1816).
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of attack or defense so specially, that the adversary shall not
be taken unawares, by matters springing up on the trial of
which he is not apprised by the pleadings; and that the
judgment which may be rendered on the issue joined, will
enable him, against whom it has been given, to protect himself by the plea of res adjudicata, should a subsequent
demand be made for the same thing...
While the courts have held that the deficiencies of a pleading
which did not contain sufficient allegations to guard the adversary against surprise might be cured by knowledge acquired by
the adversary aliunde (as in the above case where the adversary
was made aware of the contention while taking depositions prior
to trial), the jurisprudence has not deviated from the requirement
that the parties have fair and full notice of the factual conten12
tions of their adversaries.
It may be that the objectives of fair notice, and the establishment of the basis for the allowance of the plea of res judicata,
attributed to the Federal Rules by Professor Moore and Judge
Clark, 13 are the same as those which have been declared in Louisiana for nearly a century and a half; but it must be said that the
federal jurisprudence and doctrinal writings interpreting the
Federal Rules indicate that the connotations therein given to fair
notice vary considerably from the understanding of what constitutes sufficient notice in Louisiana.
Professor Millar says that all systems of pleading must
essentially conform to one of two principles to which he refers
as the rigid and the flexible. In the rigid system he says the pleadings are structural in that they furnish the basis for the proof, and
the judgment must find its support in the pleadings as well as in
the proof. In the flexible system the allegations are but preliminary notices; once they have served this purpose they are discharged, and all depends on the case made on trial. Professor
Millar thinks it better to accept the flexible system rather than
apply palliatives to prevent the principle of rigidity from operating injustice.'

4

Dissent must be taken from the rigidity of this classification
11.
12.
13.
(1938).
14.
(1937).

Ory v. Winter, 4 Mart. (N.S.) 277, 280 (La. 1826).
See cases cited in Dart, 6 La. Dig. Pleading I, § 6.
See Note, American Bar Association Proceedings of Institutes 41
Millar, American Civil Procedure 1887-1937, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1041
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while at the same time accepting the principle of flexibility as a
very desirable objective for any system of pleading, and one
which should be an attribute of the proposed Louisiana Code of
Practice, insofar as practicable. But it must never be forgotten
that a law suit is an intensely practical matter, and theory
always must be tested on the touchstone of practicality.
Louisiana has never suffered from the technicalities of the
pleading systems which have plagued our brethren of the common law. Professor Hubert has described the situation in Louisiana in these graphic words:
"To the Louisiana lawyer the distinctions between the common law writs of trespass, case, detinue, replevin and the
like, are vague nightmares of his school days, which he fortunately need not even remember except for the satisfaction
of realizing that in Louisiana no such writs exist. The Louisiana lawyer is justly proud of the fact that in his state no
litigant need enter the temple of justice through any particular door, nor need he at his peril choose any particular weapon
with which to wage the imminent battle. Whether the case
is concerned with a contract or a tort, a relationship or a
status, the litigant need only allege the facts in an articulated
petition, ask for the relief to which he believes himself
entitled, add a catch-all prayer for general and equitable
relief, and he can be rather certain that no court will tell
him that while he has alleged a good cause of action and
deserves relief, he has chosen the wrong form of action in
15
which to assert it.'
The basis for this situation rests in principal part upon the
following:
(a) There is no distinction between law and equity in
Louisiana, which derives its civil law from the laws of France,
Spain and Rome.
(b) The appellate courts have jurisdiction of both facts and
law upon appeal.' 6
(c)

There is no replication or rejoinder in Louisiana, and

15. Hubert, A Louisiana Anomaly:

The Writ System in Real Actions,

22 Tulane L. Rev. 459 (1948). Professor Hubert is one of the reporters for the
Institute on the Revision of the Code of Practice.

16. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10, and corresponding sections of prior
constitutions. See Deutsch, Jury Trials under the Federal Rules and the
Louisiana Practice, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REvxEw 422 (1941).
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hence none of the procedural baffles which impeded the flow of
the judicial process under pleading in common law jurisdictions.
(d) The procedural law of Louisiana is sui generis, and its
development has been consistent and independent. It has tended
to be flexible rather than rigid in operation.
Louisiana under French colonial domination was regulated
by the adjective law of the Custom of Paris and the Ordinance
adopted in April, 1677, under Louis XIV, called the Code Louis,
Ordonnace Civile, or sometimes the Code Civil.
In 1769, Governor O'Reilly as Spanish Governor, abrogated
the laws of France, and substituted Spanish law instead. These
laws as to procedure prevailed until April 10, 1805, when the
Legislative Council of the Territory of Orleans, under the dominion of the United States, adopted a simple, rudimentary practice
act attributed to Edward Livingston.
This early practice act had no relationship to any system of
17
practice then prevailing in the United States or England.
In 1825, the Code of Practice prepared by Edward Livingston,
Moreau-Lislet and Pierre Derbigny was promulgated, and except
for ancillary legislation and its reenactment as the Code of Practice of 1870, it is the basic procedural law of Louisiana today.
The Practice Act of 1912, as amended,' 8 abolishing the general
denial, providing for articulated pleading and for judgment on
the pleadings; and the amendment to Article 333 of the Code of
Practice requiring the filing of all dilatory exceptions in limine
litis and simultaneously; 19 the Pre-trial Act as 1950 as amended
in 1952; and the Deposition and Discovery Statute of 1952, com20
plete the legislative history of Louisiana procedural law.
The characteristics of Louisiana procedural law which must
be taken into account in considering the several plans or systems
of pleading proposed are these:
(a) Louisiana has never had the oppressive technicalities of
common law pleading.
17. It was held in Agnes v. Judice, 3 Mart. (O.S.) 182 (La. 1813), that the
use of such terms as quo warranto, procedendo, mandamus and prohibition
did not introduce the English common law practice itself.
18. La. Act 157 of 1912, as amended by La. Acts 300 of 1914, 225 of 1924,
27 of 1926; La. R.S. 1950, 13:3601.
19. Pre-trial: La. Act 84 of 1952, La. R.S. Supp. 1952, 13:5151; La. Act 124
of 1936, La. R.S. 1950, 13:3741-3794.
20. La. Act 202 of 1952, La. R.S. Supp. 1952, 13:3741, 13:3794.
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(b) The system of pleading has been flexible and judgment
has followed the proof, and not necessarily the pleadings.
(c) Amendment of pleadings has been the rule rather than
the exception.
(d) Louisiana has adopted the pre-trial and deposition and
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules, with some minor
modifications.
In addition, the Institute has adopted as part of the projet
on pleading, all of the devices for flexibility provided by the
Federal Rules, with some modification of a minor nature.
In considering this question of the system of pleading to be
recommended in the revision of the Code of Practice, it must be
remembered then that Louisiana now has provided for the pretrial conference and adequate machinery for deposition and
.discovery by statutes modeled upon the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and that the philosophy of its procedural jurisprudence favors substance over technicality, and a liberal construction of pleadings so that the ends of justice may be served. 21 The
projet approved by the Institute crystallizes this philosophy into
concrete rules providing for liberality and flexibility which
approximate similar provisions in the Federal Rules.
The task to be performed by the pleadings must be evaluated
in the full light of these circumstances, and the system adopted
defined so as to secure the just, speedy, inexpensive and final
determination of every action cognizable by the courts.
The Reporter strongly recommended to the Council of the
Institute that the present system of fact pleading in Louisiana be
suppressed, and that the simplicity of pleading enjoyed under
the Code of Practice of 1825 be adopted. As an alternative, he
recommended the adoption of the system of notice pleading
under the Federal Rules. He mentioned the retention of the
present system of fact pleading as a third choice, but he argued
vigorously against its acceptance.
All of these plans were vigorously and fully debated and
carefully considered before the Council made its decision, the
reasons for which will appear from the following discussion.
21. Florida Molasses Co. v. Berger, 220 La. 31, 55 So. 2d 771 (1951). "The
purpose of a trial is to arrive at the true situation as it then existed. As a
matter of fact, even this Court has frequently remanded cases, when necessary, in order that the true situation may appear." Rials v. Davis, 212 La.
161, 171, 31 So. 2d 726, 729 (1947).
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THE PLAN TO RETURN TO THE SYSTEM OF PLEADING
UNDER THE CODE OF PRACTICE OF

1825

The Reporter made his proposal to return to the system of
pleading prevailing under the Code of Practice of 1825 explicit
and concrete by suggesting for adoption an article reading:
"The petition . . . shall set forth the name, surname and
residence of the parties, and shall contain a short, clear, and
concise statement of the cause of action and the object of
the demand, and a prayer for judgment for the specific
22
relief sought."
He contends that pleading under the regime of the Code of Practice of 1825 was different from current fact pleading in Louisiana
in that a plaintiff then did not have to allege the material or
ultimate facts entitling him to the relief sought as is now required.
He maintains that fact pleading crept into Louisiana procedural
law after the turn of the century, that the decision in State v.
Hackley, Hume and Joyce 23 introduced the distinction between
ultimate fact and conclusion of law into Louisiana procedural
jurisprudence, and that the Practice Act of 1912 confirmed the
distinction by statute, thereby giving Louisiana fact pleading de
24
jure and de facto.
The Reporter defines "fact pleading" as the particular system
of pleading which originated in the Field Code of Procedure in
New York in 1848. Its chief characteristic, he says, is the requirement of pleading ultimate facts (as distinguished from evidentiary facts and conclusion of law).
The Reporter says that Louisiana's system of pleading
includes these characteristics of fact pleading:
(a) The pleading of ultimate facts, which constitute the
cause of action;
(b) The denial of any effect to the pleading of conclusions
of law;
(c) The necessity of pleading full factual particulars in all
cases, under penalty of compulsory amendment, or the exclusion
25
of evidence to support a defense pleaded only generally.
22. See McMahon, The Case Against Fact Pleading in Louisiana 9
(June 6, 1952).
23. 124 La. 858, 50 So. 772 (1909).
24. See McMahon, The Case Against Fact Pleading in Louisiana 9
(June 6, 1952).
25. See McMahon, The Case Against Fact Pleading, 13 LOUISIANA LAW
RsVIEW 369 (1953).
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This thesis cannot be accepted, and for these reasons:
(a) Pleading requirements under the Practice Act of 1912
as amended, insofar as they concern the necessity for the allegation of facts, are not materially different from the pleading
26
requirements of the Code of Practice.
(b) Moreover, ever since the Livingston Practice Act of
1805, the basic test of the factual content of pleadings has been
the necessity for a plaintiff to state his cause of action, and it is
not accurate to say that it is now necessary in Louisiana to state
"full factual particulars." It has never been necessary to allege
evidence, 27 but within the ambit of our conception of "cause of
action" it always has been necessary to allege facts in order to
prove them. 28
On account of the eminent position of the Reporter in the
field of Louisiana procedural law, 29 it will be necessary to present these views (but with the natural trepidation of the layman
tilting in academic lists) more extensively and with greater
documentation than the nature of the difference of viewpoints
warrants in this discussion.
Let us first examine the pertinent parts of the appropriate
legislation prior to 1912.
26. See note 18 supra.
27. Honeycut v. Carver, 25 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 1946); Succession of
Brandon, 167 So. 515 (La. App. 1936); Smith v. Silvio, 150 So. 38 (La. App.
1933); Gaienne v. Druilhet, 143 La. 662, 79 So. 212 (1918); Montgomery v.
Chaney, 13 La. Ann. 207 (1858); West v. McConnell, 5 La. 424, 427 (1833).
28. Earlier cases are summarized in the following note annotation in
7 West's La. R.S. Ann. 1950, 13:3601, n. 310.
"Evidence in a case could not be considered on an issue not presented
by the pleadings. Williams v. His Creditors, 1818, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 618; Rodriguez v. Morse, 1824, 2 Mart. (N.S.) 358; Dumartrait v. Deblanc, 1826, 5 Mart.
(N.S.) 38; Judice's Heirs v. Brent, 1827, 6 Mart. (N.S.) 226; Ponsony v.
Debaillon, 1827, 6 Mart. (N.S.) 238; Palfrey's Syndic v. Francois, 1829, 8 Mart.
(N.S.) 260; Benoit v. Hebert, 1830, 1 La. 212; Dixon v. Emerson, 1836, 9 La.
104; Colsson v. Consolidated Ass'n Bank, 1838, 12 La. 105; Lyons v. Jackson,
1843, 4 Rob. 465; Levi v. Silverstein, 1870, 22 La. Ann. 363; Lawler v. Cosgrove, 1887, 39 La. Ann. 488, 2 So. 34."
Among later cases holding that recovery cannot be had on a cause of
action not alleged, and that proof must correspond with the allegations are:
Jones v. Abercrombie, 178 La. 427, 151 So. 641 (1933); Simon v. Duet, 177 La.
337, 148 So. 250 (1933); Richard v. Director General of Railroads, 160 La.
1019, 107 So. 891 (1926).
29. Professor McMahon is author of Louisiana Practice (1939) and
numerous law review articles on Louisiana practice. His only predecessor
who critically discussed the entire subjects of pleading and practice was
K. A. Cross, who published his "Pleading in Courts of Ordinary Jurisdiction"
in 1885. Until the appearance of the digests prepared by West Publishing
Company and Bobbs-Merrill Company, Louisiana digests were prepared by
eminent lawyers and judges.
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The Practice Act of 180530 required the petition to state "the
cause of action" and the answer to "without evasion answer
1
every material fact stated in plaintiff's petition.
The Codes of Practice of 1825 and 1870 (Article 172), provided, in pertinent part, that
"4. The petition must contain a clear and concise statement of the object of the demand, as well as of the title, or
the cause of action on which it is founded."
"6. It must end by conclusions analogous to the nature
of the action to which the plaintiff has resorted."
The Projet of the Code of Practice of 1825 attributes the
source of this article to the Practice Act of 1805. 32 Cross8 3 and

McMahon 34 point to Las Siete Partidas for its origin, which
requires the petition to set forth "the cause of action. For all
these things being set forth in the petition, the defendant will
know with certainty what to answer, the plaintiff what to prove,
and the judge how to inform himself of the whole matter, and
3' 5
to proceed in the cause according to law.
Under the regime of the Codes of Practice of 1825 and 1870,
the defendant was permitted to file a general denial without
specially answering to all of the allegations of the petition, except
when called upon to acknowledge or deny his signature (Article
323). However, if the defendant intended to make a special
defense by means of some exception, he was required to plead
it expressly and positively in his answer (Article 327). He could
allege facts in his answer different from those alleged by the
plaintiff (Article 328) but in that event they were considered
30. La. Act of April 10, 1805, c. 26; 2 Martin, Digest 155 (1816).
31. The Reporter says this act was primarily a refinement and simplification of contemporary chancery practice, citing Millar, The Fortunes of
Demurrer, 31 Ill. L. Rev. 596, 605 (1937). However, the Supreme Court, in
Abat v. Whitman, 7 Mart. (N.S.) 162 (La. 1828), said that the use in the act
of the common law terms quo warranto, procedendo, mandamus and prohibition "ought to be considered rather as a translation of the names formerly

used than as emanating from English jurisprudence. That their adoption as
words can by no rule of law be considered as having introduced the English

practice."

See also Flogny v. Adams, 11 Mart. (O.S.) 547 (La. 1822); State

ex rel. Morgan's L. & T. Co. v. Judge, 33 La. Ann. 954 (1881). There seems to
be little significance to the Reporter's observation in the discussion on that

point.
32. 2 Louisiana Legal Archives 31 (1937).

33. Cross, Pleading in Courts of Ordinary Jurisdiction 142 (1885).
34. The Case Against Fact Pleading, Report to Council of Louisiana
State Law Institute, No. 21, p. iii (June 6, 1952).
35. Las Siete Partidas, 3.2.40 (1 Moreau and Carleton's transl. 58 [1820]).
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as denied by the plaintiff, for neither replication nor rejoinder
was permitted (Article 329).
These are the texts of the procedural law important to this
question in force in Louisiana prior to the Practice Act of 1912.
Intrinsically examined, it appears that the plaintiff is required to
state a cause of action, a term which always has been simply
defined and well understood in Louisiana, but which has been
36
discarded in the Federal Rules.
In Louisiana, it has been said with reference to the term
"cause of action" that "when used with reference to the pleadings
by which the cause of action is alleged, the phrase signifies the
facts upon which the plaintiff's right to sue is based and upon
coupled with facts which
which defendant's duty has arisen,
3' 7
constitute the latter's wrong.
Intrinsically, then, these texts indicate that facts material to
the cause of action and its defense must be stated in the pleadings,
a requirement that is made explicit in the Practice Act of 1805
by the direction to defendant to "without evasion answer every
materialallegation of the petition."
It is difficult to look back over the span of years-nearly a
century and a half-and determine from several selected cases the
attitude of the chief actors in the drama of litigation. As the
Reporter says in his polemic against fact pleading appearing in
this LAW REVIEW, the compass of this discussion will not accommodate detailed or extended discussion of cases.
He has, however, referred to some of the earlier cases which
announce the rule that the objective of notice of the demand or
defense sufficient to prevent surprise on the trial will be attained
if the opposite party have knowledge sufficient for that purpose
38
either from the pleadings or the proceedings before trial.
The basis for this jurisprudence does not arise out of the
system of pleading, but rests upon equitable principles akin to
estoppel. In the case of Flogny v. Adams,8 9 the court attributed
this rule of law to Spanish sources, saying:
36. 1 Moore, Federal Practice 3, 145, 150 (1938); Clark, Code Pleading H§
19, 70 (2 ed. 1947).
37. Quoted from 2 Words and Phrases, First Series, Cause of Action 1017,
in Rope v. Madison, 192 La. 593, 188 So. 711 (1939).
38. Citing Ralston v. Barclay, 6 Mart. (O.S.) 649 (La. 1819); Ory v.
Winter, 4 Mart. (N.S.) 277 (La. 1826); Ives v. Eastin, 6 La. 13 (1833); Frierson
v. Irwin, 5 La. Ann. 525 (1850).
39. Flogny v.. Adams, 11 Mart. (O.S.) 547, 548 (La. 1822).
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"We have held in the cases of Canfield vs. M'Laughlin, 9
Martin, 303, Bryan and wife vs. Moore's heirs, 11 ibid. 26, and
in Larche vs. Jackson, ibid. 284; that where the parties alleged
rights in one capacity, and proved them in another, without
objection in the inferior court, we would proceed to give
judgment on the merits. These cases were decided in pursuance of a provision in the Novissima Recopilacion, 11, 16, 2;
and upon the consideration that the principle of law which
requires proof, and allegation to correspond, was made for
the protection of the adversary, who might waive it if he
chose.
"Should, however, the objection be made when the testimony is offered, the law which authorized these decisions,
does not apply; and the equity on which they were founded
vanishes. Another rule governs them; that which requires
that there be no variance between the evidence and the
demand. Febrero, lib. 3, cap. 1, sec. 7, n. 283, 8 Martin, 400."
The principle that there be no variance between the evidence
and the demand, and which, incidentally, seems to be a principal
point of attack of the opponents of fact pleading, is certainly one
of its chief incidents or characteristics. Professor McMahon,
however, argues that during this early period and until the turn
of the century, a plaintiff need allege only the substance of his
demand, and that it was immaterial that his allegations were
actually conclusions of law.
It has been noted that the digests of the jurisprudence during
this period were prepared by eminent lawyers, for it is only since
very recent times that we have had the great benefit of discussion
based on the scholarly research performed in our law schools.
These digests, therefore, give something more than the impersonal all-inclusive texts of their modern successors from the great
publishing houses. They reflect the opinions of active practitioners concerning the import of contemporary decisions. They
give a panoramic view of the jurisprudence on a particular point
of law, quite sufficient for the purposes of this discussion, and
furnish a clew by which the inquisitive may examine the minutiae of the constituent decisions.
Thus, the very first digest of the Louisiana Reports, covering
the Martin Reports,4° on the subject of pleading has this to say:
40. Christy, Digest of Martin's Reports, verbo "Practice" No. 19, p. 253
(1826).
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"19. Every circumstance which is proper to be known,
in order to put the defendant on his defence to the suit, ought
to be stated in the petition. Duncan et al Syndics v. Bechtel
vi Mart. 510."
"23. Fact which must be proven, must be alleged in the
petition, that the adverse party may have an opportunity to
disprove them in the inferior court. Bouthemy v. Dreux et al
XII Mart. 639."
"35. The allegata and probate must agree. White and
al v. Noland iii Mart. (N.S. 636, Stroud v. Beardslee ii Mart.

(N.S. 84."
A later digest, covering the period 1838-1843,'4 1 reiterated this
rule as follows:
"1. The plaintiff is bound to set out every fact material
to his case, whether it involves a positive or a negative; but
he is not required to allege the absence or non-existence of
facts which might defeat his action. Mathews v. Pascal's
executors. 13 L. R. 47."
Another digest of this formative period, covering the period
1809-1851,42 contains the statement which seems to be completely
41. Deslix Report, 13 La. to 3 Robinson, verbo "Pleadings" No. 1 (1843).
42. Hennen, A Digest of Reported Decisions from 1 Martin to 6th La.
Annual, 1809-1851, verbo "Pleading" V-(a) (3) 2, p. 1199 (1852). A later edition,
which includes up to the 15th Annual, published in 1861, contains another
statement of this principle, which permits the introduction of evidence under
indefinite and Informal pleadings if from the pleadings and proceedings
before trial the opposite party have sufficient notice of the nature of the
demand or defense advanced, and could not be surprised.
Cross criticized the jurisprudence cited by Hennen in his treatise on
pleading. Pleading in Courts of Ordinary Jurisdiction 87 (1885). He considered that some looseness had developed in exceptional cases, which he considered to have been corrected. He said: "But in other cases the court has
given such positive declaration of the sound doctrine, that we may now confidently rely on the just requirement of accurate and definite pleading in the
courts of record. In Picket v. Nance, 14 La. Ann. 668 (1859), the court distinctly says: 'Although great latitude is allowed under our system of practice, yet the plaintiff is required to make a clear and concise statement of
the object of his demand, as well as the nature of his title, or the cause of
action on which it was founded.' In the late case (Burbank vs. Harris, 32 A.
396), the repudiation of the heresy we have been considering is put in still
more emphatic and peremptory form. Although the case had been remanded
for trial on a certain issue, it was held that proof was not admissible on the
plea thus distinctly set forth, without a formal amendment of the pleadings;
'for,' says the court, 'we could not be understood to offer proof to be admitted,
which was clearly inadmissible under the pleadings.' In fact, there can be
no just reason for this loose practice, which has been permitted in exceptional cases in order to meet the equities developed by peculiar circumstances.
It has produced a fluctuating temper in the administration of justice; it has
given license for careless and negligent pleading, leading to confusion and
difficulty in deciding causes; and it has conferred inordinate discretion on
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at variance with the Reporter's contention that Louisiana enjoyed
a system of quasi-notice pleading during this period. There it
is said:
"2. Vague and general allegations cannot support a
petition. The cause of action, the object of the demand, and
the nature of the title must be stated with such certainty as
to apprize defendant of every circumstance necessary to put
him on a just defence; and to bar a subsequent investigation
of matters once decided. If the substance of plaintiff's case
be set forth, mere technicalities cannot affect it; but he must
be held to his material and substantive allegations, for the
obscurity or duplicity of which he can take no advantage to
the prejudice of defendant who will be protected, when surprised. C.P. 172. Duncan v. Bechtel, 6 M. 510; Ralston v.
Barclay Ib. 649; Ory v. Winter 4 N.S. 284; Florance v.
Nixon 3 L. 292; Hatch v. City Bank, 1 R. 470; Succession of
Kendrick, 7 R. 138; Barrett v. Lacharie, 2 A. 655; Blackly v.
Matlock, 3 A. 366; Gremillion v. Bonaventure, 4 A. 60; Seghers
v. Lemaitre 5 A. 263."
These statements of eminent lawyers concerning the law of
the periods in which they lived constitute a sort of answer in
globo to the Reporter's contention that pleading during the 19th
century was not the fact pleading of the present, but something
that approached the notice pleading of the Federal Rules.
It was not intended in this expose des motifs to discuss every
one of the cases quoted from or cited in the presentation of the
Reporter's views against fact pleading. A detailed and critical
evaluation of each of these decisions4 seems unnecessary in the
light of these generalized statements. 3
There have been times when exceptional cases have caused
some deviation in the detailed application of the broad principles
expressed in these digests, and in the cases upon which they are
the inferior tribunals, by practically giving them power to admit testimony
by a liberal, or to reject it by a stringent, application of the technical rules."
43. Other witnesses of like character could be called, but they might not

be heard, because the evidence they would give would be cumulative, but
they should be named for those who might be inquisitive. They are: Benjamin and Slidell, Digest of Reports-1 Mart. (O.S.) to 5 La. Reports 1809-1833,
revised to cover 1809-1839, verbo Practice, D-Nos. 26, 33 (1834); Greiner's
Annotated Code of Practice (1839) contains laconic annotations to the same
general effect under Article 172; Loque, A Digest of Decisions from 1st
Annual to page 800, 30th Annual, verbo Pleading V-(a) (b) (1)-No. 1, V(c) (1)
No. 1 (1878); Taylor's Digest (1889), Breaux's Digest (1901) and Roehl's
Digest (1911), had no discussion of precisely similar questions.
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based. 44 The variables of talent, environment, application and
ability of expression of judge and lawyer, and the eccentricities
of circumstance tend toward some degree of inconsistency in
jurisprudence.
But here there has been no deviation from the broad principles upon which Louisiana rules of pleading are based-the
material facts, or the facts constituting the substance of the complaint and defense must be stated clearly and concisely, and the
parties will not be allowed to prove that which is not alleged.
And these principles have applied in Louisiana ever since the
Practice Act of 1805.
The Reporter thinks that the influence of fact pleading, as
he described it, began to assert itself around the turn of the.
century, although he frankly states that he could find no cases
during this period which conclusively so indicated. He thinks
the negligence form in Flemming's Formulary 45 published in 1903
"offers fairly convincing proof that, at least in negligence cases,
the pleading of full factual particulars was either required or
considered the safer practice."
The Reporter considers that the rules of fact pleading were
accepted by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in the case of
State v. Hackley, Hume and Joyce,46 decided in 1909, which he
considers to have had the immediate effect of changing the procedural philosophy of Louisiana.
He considers that the Pleading and Practice Act of 191247
following the decision in'the Hackley, Hume and Joyce case gave
statutory sanction to the fact pleading recognized and accepted
in that case.
With due deference, these views cannot be accepted. The
Hackley, Hume and Joyce case had no such paroxysmal effect on
the procedural laws of this state, and there is no evidence that it
was even remotely connected with the movement for the adoption of the Practice Act of 1912..
In the Hackley, Hume and Joyce case, the state sought to
recover lands under allegations that patents had been fraudulently obtained, and that the defendants who claimed to own
them by titles emanating from the patentee were holders in
bad faith.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See note 42 supra.
Flemming, A Formulary of Civil Procedure (1903).
State v. Hackley, Hume and Joyce, 124 La. 854, 50 So. 772 (1909).
La. Act 157 of 1912; as amended this act is now La. R.S. 1950, 13:3601.
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An exception of no cause of action was sustained, and an
exception of want of tender not passed upon. On appeal by the
state, on original hearing in the Supreme Court, the exception
of no cause of action and exception of want of tender were overruled. On rehearing, the judgment below maintaining the exception of no cause of action was reinstated and the suit dismissed,
with leave to the state to renew its suit on proper allegations. On
rehearing the court took the position that even though the patent
might be invalid because of the fraud of the entryman, the mesne
conveyances by which the defendants held title might be good,
and each of them an insurmountable barrier to the claims of the
state. The court said that this results from the jurisprudence
that where fraud has been committed by the patentee, the government cannot recover the land from a third person who acquired
it for valuable consideration and without notice of the fraud.
The court held that the allegation that defendants were
"holders in bad faith" was a mere conclusion of law, since the
connotation of Article 3452 of the Civil Code defining a "holder
in bad faith" only extends to knowledge that there is an invalidity
and not to the facts from which the invalidity of his title is sought
to be deduced.
The court discussed the difference between allegations of fact
and conclusions of law, quoting extensively from 31 Cyc. 51, as
elaborately discussed in Professor McMahon's paper.
This was not the first time that the court had made the same
distinction and in exactly the same words. In State v. Capitol
City Oil Mills v. Monroe,48 the court said:
"The statement that the allegations of the petition for injunction are to be taken as true for the purpose of a decision as to
whether the prohibited act was one such as would work plaintiff in injunction irreparable injury must be taken with the
limitation attached to the rule announced, which is that it
extends to and covers all allegations well pleaded, not to
conclusions of law nor matters of mere evidence pleaded in
the petition (Fertilizing Co. v. Wolf, 48 La. Ann. 631, 19 So.
558) nor to surplusage."
In another case 49 the court likewise referred to "conclusions,"
saying:
48. State ex rel. Capital City Oil-Mills Co. v. Monroe, 50 La. Ann. 266,
23 So. 839 (1897).
49. Southern Chemical and Fertilizing Co: v. B. J. Wolf & Sons, 48 La.
Ann. 631, 19 So. 558 (1896).

1953]

RETENTION OF PRESENT PLEADING

"Plaintiffs in their petition have pleaded part of the evidence
upon which they would rely in the event of a trial on the
merits, and announced in some places conclusions of law.
These particular portions of the petition all do not consider
falling under the rule invoked, that on the trial of an exception of no cause of action the allegations of the petition are
taken for true."
In fact, there are many cases, covering a wide range of time,
where the petitions have been dismissed because of generality
and vagueness, which, to all intents, are very often the equivalent
of the term "conclusion of law." Some of these cases were cited in
the Hackley, Hume and Joyce case. 50
Disagreement must also be expressed with the conclusion of.
the Reporter that the petition in the Hackley, Hume and Joyce
case would have been a proper pleading under the Louisiana law
theretofore existing. Actually the author of the original opinion
concurred in the opinion on rehearing, and in a short opinion,
said that the petition should have alleged that each successive
holder of the title had knowledge of the original fraud. Enough
of Louisiana jurisprudence has already been cited to demonstrate
the correctness of the ruling.5 1
The decision was the first elaborate statement of the distinction between ultimate facts, conclusions of law and evidence,
and it was followed by a spate of cases involving the sufficiency
of pleadings in which the distinction was discussed in terms of
50. Seghers v. Lamaitre, 5 La. Ann. 263 (1850); Landry v. Dickson and

Boyken, 7 La. Ann. 238 (1852); Perkins v. Potts, 8 La. Ann. 14 (1853); Compton v. Compton, 9 La. Ann. 499 (1854); Waddell v. Judson, 12 La. Ann. 13

(1857); Rooks v. Williams, 13 La. Ann. 374 (1858). See also Stevens v. Pinneo,
26 La. Ann. 617 (1874) to the effect that an allegation that no formality of
law has been observed in the seizure and sale of property is so vague that it
amounts to nothing.
51. Professor McMahon attributes the decision in the Hackley, Hume and
Joyce case wholly to adherence "to the rules of fact pleading."

His position

Is that the allegation of the conclusions of law should have been sufficient,
and attributes the semantic philosophy of Humpty Dumpty to the court in
making its distinction concerning the implications of "holder in bad faith"

with relationship to "without valuable consideration" and "with notice." The
author thinks the distinction made by the court had real merit. Under the
applicable law, as Judge Monroe said in his concurrence on rehearing, the
bad faith, depending on knowledge of the fraud of the original entryman, on
the part of each intervening transferee of the title attacked, was critically
important to the plaintiff's case. The codal implication of the conclusion
"possessor in bad faith" could mean that the possessor knew his title was

defective, but not how it was defective, and knowledge of the particular
vitiating fraud must be brought home not only to the possessors, but to all
intervening transferees. That is the way I understand the court's decision,
and it makes sense to me.
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ultimate facts and conclusion of law. But that is only evidence
of the impulse of semantics on jurisprudence, an observable phenomenon whenever new words are used to define old distinctions.
But the fact pleading we had after State v. Hackley, Hume and
Joyce was no different from the fact pleading we had before, and
the decision in that case effected no change in our procedural
law, either in the jurisprudence, or as the cause of the adoption
of any legislation.
The Pleading and Practice Act of 1912 was not passed as a
result of the Hackley, Hume and Joyce case, and it seems hardly
possible that the eminent members of the Louisiana Bar who
drafted and proposed this legislation would have failed to mention that the proposed statute was introducing fact pleading into
the Louisiana statute law, if such indeed were true. Neither did
the committee mention the Field Code of 1848 for New York.
The Louisiana State Bar Association considered this practice
reform at two annual meetings: in 1910, soon after the final
52
decision in the Hackley, Hume and Joyce case, and again in
1912. That case was not mentioned in the printed record of the
discussions at those meetings.
The Practice Act of 1912 was an attempt to require responsibility and definition in the place of irresponsibility and generality,
by requiring pleadings to be verified under oath, and to state in
articulated form the respective claims of the plaintiff and defendant, with provisions for judgment in the pleadings, in case of an
insufficient answer, thereby effectively abolishing answer by way
53
of general denial.
52. On rehearing, November 29, 1909.
53. Because the proceedings of the Louisiana State Bar Association for
1910 and 1912, published in Louisiana State Bar Association Reports for those
years, are not readily obtainable, pertinent extracts are reproduced in
this note.
In 1910, a committee from the Bar Association headed by Mr. R. E.
Milling, prepared an act which was described by him as having "the effect of
requiring opposing attorneys to narrow the issues by simple and non-technical
pleadings. Our idea is that the petition should set forth concisely the plaintiff's full case." The committee was composed of Mr. Milling, E. P. Florance
and John Dyamond, Jr. This act provided that the judge should examine the
pleadings, order amendment if necessary to define issues, and then limit the
proof to the Issues raised-a proposal for a pre-trial procedure of considerable merit. 12 La. Bar Assn. Rep. 136. The act was not adopted because it
was introduced too late during the legislative session to secure consideration.
Another committee of the Bar Association prepared the draft of the bill,
which became the Practice Act of 1912.
The reasons for this act are best explained in the words of those who
prepared it. In presenting the draft of this act to the Bar Association, Mr.
Charles P. Fenner said:
"I say, I think it must be admitted that in Louisiana, where we are
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really operating today under practically the same system of procedure which
was adopted by the state as a pioneer in that field in 1826, there are reforms
which may be adopted with wisdom.
"I assume that we will all agree upon this general proposition: That in
framing a system for the administration of Justice in the Courts, we ought
to so frame the system as to accomplish the results which we want to
accomplish as speedily and with as little expense either of effort or of
money, as practicable. I say, I assume that we all agree to that general
proposition. Now, in that connection, then, the following questions inevitably
suggest themselves:
"In any rational system of procedure, why should the party plaintiff be
permitted to invoke the consideration by the court of a claim for relief
based upon allegations of fact which he is unwilling or unable to verify
under reasonable conditions by his affidavit? Why should a defendant be
permitted to delay the administration of justice by the filing of frivolous
exceptions, intended merely for delay? Why should such a defendant be
permitted to further delay and impede the administration of justice by
denying things which, upon his oath, he must admit to be true? Why should
the administration of justice be impeded and rendered costly and expensive
by the necessity of procuring and administering proof of allegations of fact
which the other party, under oath, would be obliged to admit? And finally,
why should a plaintiff be subject to the delay incidental to the regular fixing
of his case for trial on the merits, when it is apparent, on the fact of the
pleadings, that he is entitled to a judgment?
"I confess that I find it very difficult to give any satisfactory reply to
any of these questions. And yet it must be conceded that everyone of the
criticisms which are implied in these questions may be justly levied against
the system of jurisprudence under which we practice in the state of
Louisiana. In this state, a plaintiff may go into the court and invoke the
consideration of the court of a claim for relief based upon allegations which
he could not go on the stand and verify by his oath,-allegations which he
could not verify by an affidavit attached to his petition....
"So a plaintiff may file a petition based upon numerous allegations of
fact, proof of which may be difficult and expensive, no one of which the
defendant could under oath, deny, and yet, under our system, all that the
defendant has to do is file a general denial and the plaintiff. is put, not
merely to the trouble, but to the expense of procuring, in the first place,
and then administering in the court, proof of every one of these allegations,
with the result that the record and the costs are immensely increased.
"And so, under our system of procedure, it not infrequently happens that
a plaintiff having filed a petition, to which the defendant files a pleading by
way of answer, which sets forth no defense whatever, I say it not infrequently happens that such a plaintiff is obliged to wait until, in the due and
orderly course of procedure, his case is reached for trial on the merits, before
he can go through the formality of taking a judgment. That is all it
amounts to under the circumstances. A man filed, in one of the divisions of
the Civil District Court, a suit on a promissory note-in a division which
happens to be way behind on its docket,-the defendant comes in and files
a general denial (a pleading under which he cannot introduce evidence of
any possible defense) and the plaintiff may be delayed for a year before he
can get a judgment on his petition. Now, I say, we must admit, it seems to
me, that those are abuses. The only question is, is it practicable to so amend
the law as to do away with those abuses.
"The first bill (pleading and practice act of 1912), which is presented by
your committee is an attempt to remedy those abuses and to expedite and
facilitate trials and decrease the cost of litigation."
He then took up the bill, section by section, and said:
"Well, of course (after reading the first section) that is a very simple
provision-its purpose and object are simply to have the plaintiff so frame
his petition as to enable the defendant to comply with the requirements of
the second section, when he files his answer. That is to say either admit or
deny each of the material allegations of the petition."
Mr. P. J. Chappuis, a member of the committee, spoke at the same time,
and said:
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Professor McMahon says that the most important feature of
the statute and one which he admits was apparently not an
objective of its draftsmen, was the requirement that "material
facts" be pleaded in numbered paragraphs. He says that after
Hackley, Hume and Joyce these words could only mean "ultimate" facts, with all of the resulting implications. The inference
is unwarranted, but if warranted, not significant.
If the Hackley, Hume and Joyce decision had made such a
violent change in Louisiana pleading, could it not just as reasonably be concluded that the use of a different term so soon after
that decision implied a rejection rather than an adoption of the
language used in that case?
As a matter of fact we began the use of the term with the
earliest legislation on pleading, wherein it was provided "That
all suits ... shall be commenced by a petition . . . which shall,
state the names of the parties, their places of residence, and the
cause of action, with the necessary circumstances of places and
dates" and "That every answer ... shall without evasion, answer
every material fact stated in the plaintiff's petition.'' 54 (Italics
supplied.)
And the last Louisiana practice act provides: "The plaintiff
in his petition shall state his cause of action articulately, that is to
say, he shall, so far as practicable, state each of the material facts
"Pleadings are the written allegation of what is affirmed on one side
or denied on the other, disclosing the real matter in dispute between the
parties, and forming the foundation of proof to be submitted on the trial.
It is desirable that the issues should be reduced to the smallest possible
number, or, in other words, that looseness in any system of pleading should
not put it within the power of a litigant to multiply issues when in reality
they are without foundation of fact.
"The system in Louisiana, as it has obtained all these years, has been
a most prolific source of loose, vague and indefinite pleading, by putting it
within the power of the defendant to throw on the plaintiff the whole onus
of making out his case by simply pleading the general denial, which puts

the plaintiff to proof of all conditions precedent to recovery, although it
may well be that in truth there is no real controversy regarding any number
of the material facts involved in the trial. It -is the experience of every
lawyer that there are but few cases in which the real dispute is not confined
to but a few material facts; yet, when one thinks of the efforts, the time and
the money spent in securing unnecessary evidence, and the time wasted by
the bench and bar in reviewing records made voluminous by such unneces-

sary evidence, he is surprised that some means have not long ago been
found to put an end to this abuse."
"I have said, I believe this bill is a step in the right direction; but I do
not think it is a panacea for all the evils which beset the administration of
justice. To a great extent, the remedy for many forms of injustice will be
found in the proper conception and observance by members of the Bar, of

the ethics of the profession set forth in the charter of this association." 13 La.
Bar Ass'n Rep. 111 et seq. (1911).
54. Act of April 10, 1805, c. 26, 2 Martin's Digest 155.
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upon which he bases his claim for relief, in a separate paragraph,
separately numbered." (Italics supplied.)
And the defendant is required in his answer to "either admit
or deny specifically each material allegation of fact contained in
plaintiff's petition." (Italics supplied.) 5
And in the long intervening period under the regime of the
Code of 1825, Benjamin and Slidell were saying "The proof should
correspond with the material allegations"56 and Deslix that "The
plaintiff is bound to set out every fact material to his case." 57
Louisiana has not been over technical in the use of language
in relation to pleading and practice. Whether it be "material
facts" or "ultimate facts"-or just simply facts-when used in
relation to pleading requirements, the one common denominator
of all of the decisions, well understood, and generally applied, has
been the requirement that the plaintiff make a short, concise
statement of the facts constituting his cause of action.
The provision for the machinery to test the factual content
of petitions as stating a cause of action, by means of the exceptions of no cause of action and of vagueness, 58 long before the
Hackley, Hume and Joyce case, is strongly corroborative of the
view that there was no difference in the fact pleading requirements of Louisiana practice brought about by that case or the
Practice Act of 1912.
It is not believed, therefore, that there is any material difference between the system of pleading facts under the Code of
1825 and the present law.
The Reporter had originally suggested that Article 12 of the
projet should provide "The petition. . . shall'contain ... a short,
clear, and concise statement of the cause of action."
55. La. Act 157 of 1912. As amended this act is now La. R.S. 1950, 13:3601.
56. See note 43 supra.
57. Deslix Report, 13 La. to 3 Robinson, verbo "Pleadings" No. 1 (1843).
58. McMahon, The Exception of No Cause of Action in Louisiana, 9
Tulane L. Rev. 17 (1934). See also Wortham, Civil Procedure in Louisiana
(1916), of which only the first volume was published. He explains the distinction between the exceptions of no cause of action and vagueness in this
manner: "The distinction is that, when the allegations are too vague and
indefinite to admit of proof, the exception of no cause of action lies; if not,
the defendant must content himself with demanding greater fullness of averment in limine, by the exception of vagueness .... The point at which the
allegations become too vague and indefinite to admit of proof is variable, and
cannot be established by any rule which could be applied in all cases. In re
Sprowl's Will, 109 La. 352, 33 So. 365; See State v. Hackley, Hume & Joyce,
124 La- 854, 50 So. 772 (1909) and instances cited."
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In the light of the definition of "cause of action" in Hope v.
Madison59 and the views hereinabove expressed, the Reporter's
recommendation couched in this language would have been
acceptable except for the vigorous views he had expressed in his
accompanying commentaries, and his later recommendation that
another article of the projet be changed "so as to reflect clearly
and unequivocally a legislative intent to overturn the present
jurisprudential rules of fact pleading." 60
The Reporter has argued well and vigorously in support of
his recommendations. He says that, after all, it is a question of
degree, that any system of pleading necessarily must require that
some facts be pleaded. He says that full factual details and particulars should not be required. If he means that the pleading
of evidence should not be required, there is complete agreement,
for Louisiana does not make any such requirement. The dividing
lines between ultimate or material fact, conclusion of law, and
evidence, in the realm of pleading are broad and not sharp and
precise-as indeed the lines between questions of fact and questions of law, between substance and procedure are broad. What
test, then, can the Reporter offer by which to determine when
allegations that are "general" and do not "include factual details
or particulars" at the same time state a cause of action?
"Cause of action" is a term well understood, and consistently
applied in Louisiana pleading, and the projet for the revision
contains the time honored pleading devices of the exceptions of
"no cause of action" and of "vagueness," but under their respective family names, 61 as the means of testing the sufficiency of
the allegations of fact in a plaintiff's petition. But the qualifications suggested by the Reporter will bring to "cause of action"
uncertainty where there is now understanding, and the looseness
which is often the result of generality. Consequently, the plan
59. Hope v. Madison, 192 La. 593, 188 So. 711 (1939): ". . . as used in
pleadings the phrase signified the facts upon which plaintiff's right to sue is
based and upon which defendant's duty has arisen coupled with facts which
constitute defendant's wrong."
60. Memorandum, The Case Against Fact Pleading in Louisiana, June 6,
1952, he suggested that Article 6 of the projet be redrafted to read:
"Alternative 1. All averments of the petition and answer shall be simple
concise and direct and, except as otherwise specifically required . . .may be
general, and need not include any factual details or particulars .. "
"Alternative 2. Same as above except after "otherwise specifically
required" the suggested article reads "need not include factual details or
particulars."
61. "No cause of action" is now a ground for "the peremptory exception";
"vagueness" a ground for "the dilatory exception."
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to abandon the present system of fact pleading and the adoption
of the system recommended by the Reporter was rejected.
THE PROPOSAL TO ADOPT NOTICE PLEADING
MODELED ON THE FEDERAL RULES
The essence of the "notice" system of pleading urged upon
the Institute as an alternative to the quasi-notice pleading first
recommended to the Institute is contained in the General Rules
of Pleading of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where it is
provided:
"A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief ... shall contain... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief ... The philosophy underlying this system of pleading considers it to be the function of the pleadings (a) to give fair notice
of the claim asserted so as to enable the adverse party to answer
and prepare for trial, (b) to allow for the application of the doctrine of res judicata, and (c) to show the type of case brought,
so that it may be assigned to the proper form of trial. This
philosophy sounds familiar to the Louisiana lawyer, because the
objectives of notice and finality have always been sought through
pleadings in Louisiana courts.
The writings of the doctrinaires, 63 however, interpreting
these functions, are far afield from our ideas concerning them,
and the many decisions of the federal courts interpreting the
rules have made the functions of pleadings impotent and ephemeral, 64 somewhat after the fashion of the system of flexible pleading described by Professor Millar.6"
One of the best definitions of the purpose of the pleading
stage of litigation, has been given by one who, however, advocates
a plan counter to the theory of the adversary system of litigation.
He says:
"What is the purpose of the pleadings in an action? From the
62. Rule 8(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

63. See 2 Moore, Federal Practice 1607, 1647 (2 ed. 1948); Clark, Code
Pleading 225 (2 ed. 1947).
64. In one of the earliest cases, SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34,
1 F.R. Serv. 8a, case 4 (N.D. Calif. 1939), it was said that: "The modern
philosophy concerning pleadings is that they do little more than indicate
generally the type of litigation that is involved. A generalized summary of
the case that affords fair notice is all that is required."
65. See Millar, American Civil Procedure 1887-1937, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1017

(1937).
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standpoint of the parties and their attorneys, the pleadings
should serve to inform each side of the contentions of the
other as to matters of fact. They should tell the defendant
what he is being sued for; they should tell the plaintiff what
defenses the defendant proposes to make. The pleadings
should thus facilitate preparation for trial and prevent surprise of either party at least as to matters of fact if a trial
takes place. From the standpoint of the court, the pleadings
should formulate the issues to be tried, and should inform the
trier of the nature of the cause. Moreover, they should narrow the issues to those actually in bona fide controversy and
should separate issues of fact from issues of law. This latter
is particularly important in cases where a jury is to pass on
fact issues; but even in non-jury cases, precise formulation
and separation of issues is of considerable importance in
saving the time and energy of the judge. From the standpoint of parties, attorneys and the court alike, and even more
from the standpoint of the public, a satisfactory system of
pleading should save time and expense at the trial of the
cause and should expedite its final and just determination.
The more complicated the controversy, the greater is the
need for a system of pleading which will accomplish these
purposes." 66
This is a fair statement of the credo underlying this expose
des motifs. To accomplish these purposes of the pleading stage
of litigation, the principal exponents of the notice pleading of
the Federal Rules have assigned the basic function of formulation of the issues largely to pre-trial and discovery, leaving the
function of fair notice and the allowance of the application of the
67
doctrine of res judicata to the pleadings.
Aside from the general observation that it is difficult to see
how the pleadings could afford the basis for the allowance of a
plea of res judicata without a cause of action being stated therein,
in Louisiana it might be dangerous for the issues not to appear
from the pleadings, for in Louisiana the doctrine of res judicata
is more restricted than at common law, and its scope is defined
and limited by the Civil Code. There it is provided that the
authority of the thing adjudged (res judicata) "takes place only
66. Simpson, A Possible Solution of the Pleading Problem, 53 Harv. L.
Rev. 169, 172 (1939).
67. 1 Moore, Federal Practice 438 (1 ed. 1938); 2 Moore, Federal Practice
1607 (2 ed. 1948).
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with respect to what was the object of the judgment. The thing
demanded must be the same; the demand must be founded on
the same cause of action; the demand must be between the same
parties and formed against each other in the same quality." 68 It
has been held under this article that a prior judgment must be so
in point as to control the issue in the pending case, in order to be
available as res judicata.6 9
Mr. Hennen nearly 100 years ago noted the importance of the
pleadings in the formulation of a definite issue, which is to be
regarded as determining the weight and the extent of the judgment as res judicata.
Mr. Cross on the same subject says that "We must always
look for the issue, not to the matters en pais known only to the
litigants, but to the formal statement of it, set up in the pleadings
on file, and unless this connection is regarded and maintained,
there can be no harmony in the doctrinal statement of principles
governing the formation of pleas, and of those controlling the
subject of res judicata. ' '70 If the pleadings are to serve for the
allowance of res judicata, in Louisiana it would seem that the
pleadings should set forth a cause of action.
What constitiftes "fair notice" is necessarily a variable, but
Judge Clark's ad captandum philosophy, as to the purpose of
notice, is difficult to accept. He has said:
"The aim of pleadings should be therefore to give reasonable
notice of the pleader's case to the opponent and to the court. This
does not go as far as the technical notice pleading, since it requires
notice of the pleader's entire cause, not merely that he has a
claim. The notice to the court is perhaps the more important, for
in general the opponent knows enough about the case to relieve
us of worry about him. In fact we have spent altogether too
much thought over the danger of surprising a defendant. If his
case is prepared at all adequately he will not be surprised. Our
solicitude for him will simply result in giving him opportunities
to delay the case and harass his opponent. The main purpose of
the pleadings should therefore be to give the trial court a proper
understanding of the case. If the trial court is adequately
informed of the issue by the pleadings, it means that the parties
68. Art. 2286, La. Civil Code of 1870.
69. Iselen v. Hunter Co., 173 F. 2d 388 (5th Cir. 1949).
70. Cross, Pleading in Courts of Ordinary Jurisdiction 87 (1885); Hennen,
A Digest of Reported Decisions from 1 Martin 59 6th La. Annual, 1809-1851,
verbo "Pleading" 1155 (1852).
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are likewise so informed. It is for the court, not the litigants, to
'71
vindicate pleading rules."
The Federal Rules have been interpreted as no longer requiring a plaintiff to state a cause of action. "Under the new rules
of Civil procedure," the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has
said through Judge Clark, "there is no pleading requirement of
stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action," but only
that there be "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief. ' 72 That may stem from
what has been called the "morass of decisions concerning a
74
cause of action" 73 and the variety of definitions attributed to it.
The origin of the word "claim" used as a substitute for the
phrase "cause of action" has been explained in a fairly early
case7 5 arising under the Federal Rules, where it was said that
"For the traditional and hydra-headed phrase 'cause of action'
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have substituted the word
'claim.' It is used to denote the aggregate of operative facts which
give rise to a right enforceable in the courts." See Moore, Federal Practice 3,145-150,605; Clark, Code Pleading Secs. 18.70."
The phrase "aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a
76
right enforceable in the courts" originated with Judge Clark,
and was used prior to the Federal Rules by the Supreme Court
of the United States, with attribution to Judge Clark, to describe
'77
an aspect of the meaning of "cause of action.
Were it not that the originator of this phrase and the Reporter
for the committee who drafted the Federal Rules has officially
held that there is "no pleading requirement of stating fact sufficient to state a cause of action, 78 it might be possible to say that
the use of the term "claim," as defined by Judge Swan in the
71. Clark, Code Pleading 57 (2 ed. 1947).
72. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F. 2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
73. 1 Moore, Federal Practice 145 (2 ed. 1948).
74. Clark, Code Pleading 129 (2 ed. 1947).
75. Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 Fed. 187 (2d Cir.
1943). The citation to Clark in the opinion refers to the first edition of Clark
on Code Pleading. His second edition treats of the subject of the code cause
of action in Chapter 2, Section 19. Clark says at page 147 that "The objective
was not as of old to state all of the facts constituting the cause of action,
but rather 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing [which would
show] that the pleader is entitled to relief.' This, it is submitted, is not evasion; it is constructive draftsmanship to further a definite objective." See
also 2 Moore, Federal Practice 359 (2 ed. 1948).
76. Clark, Code Pleading 81 (1 ed. 1928).
77. United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 68 (1933).
78. See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F. 2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
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original Ballet Russe case, with attribution to Judge Clark and
Mr. Moore, was the equivalent of requiring the complaint to state
facts constituting the cause of action. That is, if the Louisiana
definition of "cause of action" is used. For it must be confessed
that the phrase "aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a
right enforceable in the courts" defining "claim," seems to the
author to convey exactly the same meaning as the language in
Hope v. Madison that "as used with reference to pleadings the
phrase (cause of action) signifies facts upon which plaintiff's
right to sue is based ....
It is realized that those responsible for the Federal Rules did
not use the phrase "cause of action" because they wanted to get
away from all of the limitations with which it was encrusted in
common law jurisdictions, of which we know nothing in Louisiana. The "useless conceptual tangles" 0 described in Mr. Moore's
monumental treatise 8' seem largely to derive from the basic difference between law and equity and relate back to the writ system of common law pleading, 82 neither of which have ever
obtained in Louisiana.
Moreover the discussion by Judge Clark in "Code Pleading,"
under the rubric "cause as synonymous with right of action"
compared with Professor McMahon's definitive essay on the
exception of no cause of action in Louisiana,83 wherein he distinguished that exception from the exception of no right of action,
is further indication of the broad and fundamental differences
which prevent complete mutual understanding of these pro79. Hope v. Madison, 192 La. 593, 188 So. 711 (1939).
80. Arnold, The Code "Cause of Action" Clarified by the Supreme Court,
19 A.B.A.J. 215 (1933).
81. 2 Moore, Federal Practice 361 (2 ed. 1948): "So long as the commonlaw system of pleading was followed, a legal cause of action meant a set of
facts which when pleaded and proved would support a judgment under a
particular writ. Actually the emphasis was upon forms of action rather than
causes of action. The cause of action was not identical with facts which
occurrence had grouped together. Such a segment of life often produced
several causes of action, perhaps one equitable and several legal causes of
action. The common law as developed did not adapt itself to any existing
factual arrangement but sought artificially to straight-jacket certain fragments into causes of action, and further complicated this by the problem of
joinder of causes. A shift was inevitable. With the advent of the codes an
effort was made to adapt procedure to the exigencies of life. Law and equity
were to be merged; and there was to be but one form of action in which all
relief must be secured. Reversions to a dismembered system of law and
equity have occurred in some of the code states; but in the main a workable
union has resulted in the states, and the achieved union under the Rules is
excellent."
82. Clark, Code Pleading 130 (2 ed. 1947).
83. 5 Tulane L. Rev. 17-27 (1930).
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cedural problems. The difficulties are semantic but they originated in the mists of antiquity out of which emerged two
different systems of substantive law.
Never having been plagued with the troubles which beset
the use of "cause of action," and for the reasons given for rejecting the Reporter's recommendation to adopt a form of quasinotice pleading, the use of "claim" as that term is now defined
in federal jurisprudence 4 also must be rejected for use in the
projet for the revision. 5
There is another compelling reason for the rejection of this
generalized concept by which allegations which fail to state a
cause of action constitute a "claim" within the intendment of
the Federal Rules. It is found in the jurisprudence interpreting
the deposition and discovery rules.
The proponents of the system of the Federal Rules say that
the issue formulation function of the pleading or preparatory
stage of litigation can better be performed by the pre-trial and
discovery procedures under the rules, and therefore it is necessary that the pleadings "do little more than indicate generally
the type of litigation that is involved. A generalized summary of
the case that affords notice is all that is required."8 6
Accordingly, the official forms have been provided which
by law are "now sufficient under the rules." Form 9, Complaint
For Negligence, is illustrative of the brevity allowed. Paragraph
2 of that form reads:
"On June 1, 1936, on a public highway called Boylston Street
in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a
motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing said
highway."
Suppose the defendant, desiring to know the specific negligence
that he will be required to meet, propounds to the plaintiff this
interrogatory:
"Please state each and every act or omission to act on the
part of the defendant which you claim in any way contributed to the alleged accident."
84. 5 Federal Rules Service 785, commentary
Federal Rules." See also 2 Moore, Federal Practice
ties cited (2 ed. 1948).
85. Professor McMahon used "cause of action"
plan.
86. SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 1 F.R.
Calif. 1939).

"The 'claim' under the
359 et seq. and authoriin his first alternative
Serv. 8a, 25 case 4 (N.D.
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Under Doucette v. Howe and Bush v. Skidis, and the long line of
cases cited in the latter case, this interrogatory would be denied
because it calls for an opinion and conclusion."7
In the Bush v. Skidis case, the court permitted the defendant
to obtain the specific information by means of the allowance of
a motion for a more definite statement.
But the plethora of cases cited in Bush v. Skidis and discussed elaborately by Professor Moore88 demonstrates that the
problem of distinguishing between facts and conclusions of law
in determining the issues in litigation has been transferred from
the pleadings to the discovery process, and with much more
serious consequences.
As applied to the pleadings, the leading advocates of the
Federal Rules inveigh against the difficulties of distinguishing
"ultimate facts," "conclusions of law" and "evidence" from one
another.8 9 If the difficulty lies in the pleadings, the remedy lies
in amendment, the necessity for which in Louisiana probably
would become apparent when the issues are discussed under our
exception or pre-trial procedures, and remedied under our liberal
provisions for amendment. However, if a defendant is charged
with "negligent" conduct without other definition or specification of the acts, omissions, or conduct constituting negligence,
and he is prevented from obtaining this information through
discovery, the issues will not have been formulated and he will
not have had fair notice of that which he will be forced to meet
at the trial.
It is not enough to say with Judge Clark that the defendant
knows or should know the facts. What any litigant wants to
know is what his opponent says are the facts.
In any event, the criticisms of fact or issue pleading on
account of the difficulty of distinguishing between ultimate or
material facts and conclusions of law is addressed to the problem
of proof and its variance from the pleadings. Judge Clark says
that the rules of variance are in substance the fundamental rules
87. Bush v. Skidis, 8 F.R.D. 561, 12 F.R. Serv. 52 (1948); Doucette v. Howe,
1 F.R.D. 17 (D.C. Mass. 1909). This problem is elaborately discussed in
4 Moore, Federal Practice 2303 (2 ed. 1951).
88. 4 Moore, Federal Practice 2303 (2 ed. 1948).
89. Clark, Code Pleading 225, § 38 (2 ed. 1947); 2 Moore, Federal Practice
1640 et seq. (2 ed. 1948); 1 Moore, Federal Practice 546 et seq. (1 ed. 1938).
Professor McMahon is thoroughly in accord with Judge Clark and Professor
Moore on this point. See his memorandum against fact pleading. The Case
Against Fact Pleading in Louisiana (June 6, 1952).
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of pleading discussed throughout his book." But the problem of
variance is bound to exist even under the notice system of pleading, where, insofar as the pleadings are concerned, the distinction
between facts and conclusions is not intended to be significant.
But some place during the pre-trial state of litigation the issue,
of necessity, will have to be formulated, and the problem of
variance will arise and its solution will have to be referred to
the issues-no matter where or how formulated. If they have
been formulated by the pleadings and simplified by the pre-trial
conference, reference will be facilitated. If they have been
formulated in the pre-trial or discovery conference, reference
may not be either certain or readily available.
The remedy for this problem should be in liberality of
amendment, and in the proper functioning of pre-trial and discovery, for all of which there is ample provision in Louisiana
law today. Generality, which often begets looseness, is surely
not an answer to the problem. In any event, the problem of
distinguishing between facts and conclusions still remains under
the Federal Rules, and, as stated above, in a manner calculated
to do more harm than is now conceivable under our system of
pleading in Louisiana.
If the assumption is correct that during the pre-trial stage
of litigation the issues must be formulated, why should it be
made imperative that the work of ascertaining the issues be
postponed to the pre-trial conference or discovery?
It has been suggested that sometimes the plaintiff does not
know the facts upon which his right to recovery rests. The
answer is two-fold: In an appropriate case discovery is available
even before the filing of his suit; and, secondly, it is not often
that a litigant is so ignorant of his cause of complaint. The
ascertainment of the material facts constituting a client's cause
of action prior to the institution of suit is a duty not often
shirked by the lawyer and is conducive to the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of litigation.
If the procedures provided by the Federal Rules be followed,
in the manner contemplated, and described in the latest book on
pre-trial, 91 the judge at the first pre-trial conference will ask the
plaintiff to state his contentions and then the defendant to state
90. Clark, Code Pleading 739 (2 ed. 1947).
91. Nims, Pretrial (1950).
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his defense, and the process of formulating the issues will have
commenced.
Why would it not be better to require that this initial statement of the basis of the claim be made in the petition, and the
issues formulated by the pleadings, with the pre-trial conference
serving to narrow the issues to those actually in dispute, and to
restrict the trial to proof of those disputed questions of 'fact,
pertinent to the issues? The objection to the system in common
law jurisdictions growing out of the filing and settlement of a
multiplicity of consecutive pleadings has never obtained in
Louisiana. At one time it was possible here to delay the course
of the trial by filing dilatory exceptions consecutively, but that is
not now possible, and replication has never been permited.
If the parties can be required to give factual information to
define the issues by means of interrogation, why would it not be
better to put this information as to issues in the pleadings?
And as Judge Hulen said in Bush v. Skidis,92 "Why put the
Court and the parties to the trouble of searching through various
papers to determine what the issues are when the complaint and
answer might serve the purpose-a purpose they have served
from time immemorial." Judge Hulen in the same opinion points
to the trouble and expense that is involved in the process of
formulating the issues in the pre-trial conference or by discovery.
He concluded his opinion with these remarks:
"Nor do we consider it good practice leading to 'the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action' to
say the party seeking full information on the issues may
obtain it by pretrial conference. Such a proceeding requires
time of the court and the litigants and in the end the court
will reduce to a memorandum the issues of the case on negligence and file it in the case. To force the party charged
with negligence to resort to discovery process or pretrial
conference to learn the issues of the case as to charges of
negligence means delay and added expense in the 'determination' of the actions."
It has been most difficult to determine from the Rules and
their interpretive doctrine criteria by which to approximate the
sufficiency of pleadings under the rules. "Claim" is undefined
in the Rules, and the definition from the original Ballet Russe
92. Bush v. Skidis, 8 F.RD. 561, 564, 12 F.R. Serv. 52 (E.D. Mo. 1948).
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case-"the aggregate of' operative facts which give rise to a
right enforceable in the courts" 9 -- originally used to define one
aspect of "cause of action"-is logically incongruous with the fiat
that the complaint need not state a cause of action,0 4 and completely innocuous when confronted by some of the Official
Forms, of which Form 9 is an example which has been discussed
in this paper.
Professor Moore's test of sufficiency-"If, within the 'framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will
sustain a grant of relief to the plaintiff, the complaint is sufficient" 95-causes one to ask the meaning of "framework of the
complaint." As used in relation to the introduction of evidence,
the test poses a problem which received the attention of a very
wise Louisiana lawyer many years ago, and his observations
bear repetition here. In 1885, Mr. K. A. Cross said:
"In accordance with the distribution of the subject heretofore made, we come now to III. The allegations of a general
nature, which must be included in pleas, or in other words,
The Burden of Pleading. This discussion is embarrassed at
the outset by a vicious doctrinal error, adopted into the jurisprudence of every American State, and everywhere accepted
in our reports. This consists in assigning the topic to the
department of Evidence, and in investigating the principles
governing Pleading, at the point where the plea is to be
proved or disproved on the trial. As a consequence, the
doctrine has been stated by reference to the Burden of
Proof, but nothing has been determined as to the Burden of
Pleading. The most cursory reflection will show the disadvantage of this method. Pleading is the matrix, which
gives form to Evidence. Pleading is the original mould to
which Evidence must conform with plastic adaptation. The
allegata and the probata must agree, but it is the former
which govern, and it is only by arriving at some definite
rules determining the burden of allegation, that we can
establish a rigid and inflexible standard, by reference to
which the necessity and propriety of proof can be determined
with accuracy and precision." 96
93. See note 75 supra.
94. See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F. 2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
95. 2 Moore, Federal Practice 1653 (2 ed. 1948).
96. Cross, Pleading in Courts of Ordinary Jurisdiction, c. 6 (The Burden
of Pleading), p. 85, 86 (1885).
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But the "rigid and inflexible standard" sought by Mr. Cross
must be considered in relation to his views on the objectives of
pleading in Louisiana, which he considered to be as follows:9
"The objects contemplated by the lawmaker in requiring parties to state their demand or defence in a court of
record, according to definite and precise rules, are twofold.
(1) To give full notice to the opposite party of the grounds of
action or defence, so that proof may be shaped with reference thereto; and (2) to furnish incontestible evidence in
all future controversies of what was the subject of dispute,
and of what was decided on the issues presented."
The problem of variance, which cuts across the entire span
of pleading, 98 is not made less difficult by the generality of the
statement of the issues. What Cross evidently meant was that
the standard itself be rigid and inflexible as distinguished from
the manner in which it is applied, which need be neither inflexible nor rigid. If the requirement be that the petition state the
"facts giving rise to a right enforceable- in courts" (cf. Judge
Clark's definition and the definition in Hope v. Madison), 9 the
standard is rigidly and inflexibly fixed as to require the petition
to state "a cause of action"-but the infinite variety of the circumstances of litigation will adapt themselves to the standard with
plastic flexibility.
Both Judge Clark and Professor Moore recognize that the
particularity of allegation required should vary with the question at issue, and that the solution will vary with the case presented.0 0 But the test of "fair notice" which they suggest is
itself a variable, and as we understand it here in Louisiana, "fair
notice" is an objective of the pleading requirement that the plaintiff's petition state a "cause of action." As interpreted, the "short
and plain statement of a claim" required by the Rules does not
mean that a cause of action must be alleged. The expression is
undefined in the Rules, and the various tests in the cases and
doctrinal writings are indefinite and inconclusive, if not illusory,
and there is nothing to which the allegations can conform with
"plastic adaptation," if that phrase may be borrowed from
Mr. Cross. 1 1
97. Id. at 86.
98. Clark, Code Pleading 739 (2 ed. 1947).
99. See p. 423 supra.
160. Clark, Code Pleading 282-233 (2 ed. 1947).
101. Let none think of us as antiquarians because reference is made to
writers of another day, for Louisiana has required that pleadings be sufll-
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Professor Moore says that in borderline cases, the court
should consider
"(1)

At what stage of the action is the objection raised?

"(2)

Are the prima facie elements of the claim or defense
stated?

"(3)

If these are stated, is the statement fair notice to the
adverse party?
10 2
Is it feasible to require more particularity?

"(4)

These tests, particularly (2) and (3), seem to contain no
better definitions or criteria by which to measure the sufficiency
of pleadings than the rules themselves. What are the "prima
facie elements" of the claim or defense stated? And what is "fair
notice"? And, unless the test of finality has been abandoned,
should not another inquiry be made concerning efficacy of the
pleadings to support the allowance of res judicata between the
same parties on the same issues?
The apparent impossibility of giving workable definitions or
tests of the generality and simplicity desired by the Rules,
caused the juris-consults who guided their development by prodigious commentaries of the highest scholarship, to point to the
official illustrative forms which accompany the Rules as desiderata of simplicity and generality under the Rules: 10 3 At first
these forms were illustrative only. Now, by law, they are sufficient pleadings under the Rules.
Professor McMahon referred the Institute to an article on the
subject of "Facts" and "Statements of Facts '10 4 for its guidance.
There it was said:
"To sum up our argument: when ancient landmarks are
swept away, they must obviously be replaced by other
marks at least equally useful in guiding the wayfarer through
ciently certain to put the parties on their guard, and to support the plea of
res judicata for more than a century, and long before the days of notice

pleading in this country.
102. 2 Moore, Federal Practice 1655-1656 (2 ed. 1948).
103. Id. at 1658. Clark, Code Pleading 239, 243 (2 ed. 1947): "The simplicity sought is demonstrated by the forms of pleading the claim for relief

for breaches of contract, on the common counts, and for negligence, which
have been applied by the courts."

See Judge Clark's remarks at the Washington Institute. A.B.A. Institute
Proceedings on the Federal Rules "Washington and New York 42 et seq.

(1938).
104. Cook, 'Fact' and 'Statements of Fact,' 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 233, 246
(1937).
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the pleading wilderness. But, from the very nature of verbal
symbols and of 'facts,' a direction to 'state the facts constituting the cause of action' or to 'state in plain and concise
language the cause of action' can not possibly furnish adequate guidance. It can do little more than generate doubt
and uncertainty and provoke controversy and litigation.
That has been the uniform experience in the past. If such
directions are accompanied by an adequate set of forms,
which while not required are sufficient if used, the difficulty
is solved and peace and good order reign in the pleader's
world."
In this expose des motifs it has been explained that we
have never had any difficulty with the requirement that a plaintiff state his cause of action in his petition. Here in Louisiana,
our ancient landmarks should not be swept away in favor of the
use of such vague or indefinable or general formulae that a
system of ectypal pleading is necessary. The fears conjured up
by the following vivid description of pleading at common law
should give us pause. Professor Moore has said:
"But if ritualistic language was used to allege a duty, breach,
and consequent damage the declaration in case was good,
although only slightly informative. And since an instrument
could be pleaded according to its legal effect little factual
information was accorded the defendant in special assumpsit. The main thing was to follow a good form to be found
in Chitty, and be sure to include enough counts to circumvent the always present objection of fatal variance. And the
defendant was not obliged to controvert only those things
that were actually in dispute. The general issue, extremely
broad, in many of the forms of action, told the plaintiff
nothing more than that the defendant intended to have his
day in court."' 105
And now the Federal Rules, by the adoption of Form 9,
return the lawyer, like his predecessors of a bygone day, to Chitty
for guidance in negligence cases. 106 Louisiana never had such
pleading, and the quotation is only apropos by way of contrast
with the highly important interpretive position given to the
official forms.
105. 2 Moore, Federal Practice 1609 (2 ed. 1948). See A.B.A. Institute
Proceedings, Washington and New York 45 (1938).
106. See Judge Clark's rerarks at the Washington Institute attributing
Form 9 to Chitty, Pleading 529 (7 ed. 1844), by way of Massachusetts. 2 Mass.
Gen. Laws 1932, c. 231, § 147, Form 13.
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About the only difficulties of interpretation in Louisiana
pointed out in this discussion of this question are concerned
with distinguishing "ultimate fact," "conclusion of law" and
"evidence." It cannot be believed that these difficulties are either
as severe as they are depicted, or cause the miscarriage of justice
in the courts. The jurisprudence interpreting the use of those
terms, generated out of the actualities of the court room, is certainly a reliable and understandable landmark by comparison
with an illustrative form. The interpretation of language is of
the essence of the profession of law. It can never be adequately
accomplished with a form book.
It has been said that "[w]hat constituted good craftsmanship in pleading before the Rules continues to constitute good
craftsmanship, '10 7 but that which is permissible pleading under
the Rules would not necessarily be good craftsmanship under
what is believed still to be the prevailing opinion in the United
States.
Some of the writers have said that the settlement of pleading
questions in a busy court is dangerous because decisions are
often the result of snap judgment and may cause great harm
during later .stages of the case. If that result would happen when
pleadings alone are at issue, is it reasonable to suppose that
more and better consideration would be given by a busy court
to the formulation of issues, pleading questions and the other
details properly cognizable by the pre-trial conference?
Some of the writers against fact pleading advance arguments which presuppose ignorance, indifference, indolence, or
the lack of a proper professional attitude on the part of lawyers
at the bar. No attention has been given to them here, for such
arguments, are not susceptible of proof, and serve no useful
purpose in discussions like this.
There is an additional reason why this notice system from
the Federal Rules should not be engrafted in our Louisiana
practice, which probably exists in every state. The courts of
first instance in Louisiana have jurisdiction of cases of all kinds
and involving small amounts, unlike the federal court where the
jurisdictional amount is relatively high. In these cases involving
relatively small amounts, and constituting the bulk of litigation
in Louisiana, the necessity for resorting to pre-trial and discovery
are often oppressively expensive. Any system which requires
107. 2 Moore, Federal Practice 1654 (2 ed. 1948).
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that litigation begin with a statement of the issues in the pleadings will certainly obtain the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of these cases, more readily than where resort to pretrial and discovery is necessary.
Professor Simpson has criticised fact pleading under the
Codes in three particulars.I" They are:
First, the Code system of pleading lends itself to unnecessary delay. He says the reasons are to be found in the successive and repeated objection to plaintiff's pleadings, and
to the modern methods of securing evidence before trial.
In Louisiana we have never had replication. At one time it was
possible to delay a case by the serialized filing of dilatory exceptions. This has been remedied by a law which requires all such
exceptions to be filed at one time. 0 9 In Louisiana we have pretrial and deposition and discovery statutes. Their use is not
mandatory and since we have our own system of pleading facts,
these devices are not resorted to as would probably be the case
with notice pleading. In any event these devices do not now
cause much delay.
Second. Code pleading does not elucidate the real issues in
the case so as to inform the court and the parties of those
matters about which there is a bona fide contest. This results,
he says, from the use of the general denial, and by the
pleading of defenses not intended to be seriously urged.
In Louisiana, the general denial was abolished in 1912, and the
pleading of matters without any intention of urging them should
be made apparent at the pre-trial conference, if that instrumentality operates as it is supposed to do.
Third. Code pleading does not prevent surprise because it
was never intended to inform as to matters of law, and as to
matters of fact it does not prevent surprise of the plaintiff
by unanticipated defences. Neither does it prevent the surprise which results from preparation for trial only to have
the issue prepared against withdrawn or not urged by the
opponent.
It is believed that in Louisiana the system of pleading does
108. Simpson, A Possible Solution of the Pleading Problem, 53 Harv.
L. Rev. 184 et seq. (1939).
109. La. Act 124 of 1936, La. R.S. 1950, 13:3601, requires that the attorney
certify that such an exception is filed in good faith and not merely for the
purpose of delay.
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give sufficient information from the pleadings to prevent surprise,
and while it is not necessary to plead the "theory of the case,"
the pleadings do reflect the theory of the case, for it would seem
that in any case the lawyer bases his pleadings on a definite
11
Pre-trial
theory of the law under which he expects to recover.
and discovery should eliminate needless preparation for undisputed issues.
Professor Simpson 1 criticises notice pleading for these
failings: There is no clear definition of the issues, and no opportunity for the effective separation of fact and law questions.
There is no clarification and simplification of complex issues
prior to trial, and there is no attempt to eliminate non-good faith
claims and defenses. He says the possibility of surprise is substantial.
Of course, here he was discussing notice pleading, without
the accessory devices of pre-trial and discovery. But his observation is valuable for it points out the essential deficiencies of
notice pleading per se and when they are compared with the
difficulties of code pleading, and the discussion of their applicability in Louisiana, the superiority of the Louisiana system is
quite apparent.
RETENTION OF LOUISIANA FACT PLEADING

In Louisiana we now have substantially the pre-trial and
discovery and deposition procedures of the Federal Rules, and
the Institute has adopted a projet in the revision of the Code of
Practice which contains the motion for summary judgment, and
provisions for amendment, including amendments to cause the
pleadings to conform to the evidence (substantially Rule 15 of
110. Professor Simpson says the Scots have pleaded the "Theory of the
Case" for some years; and that the practice prevails in France, Italy, Spain

and Germany. Simpson, A Possible Solution of the Pleading Problem, 53

Harv. L. Rev. 169 (1939). On this subject see 2 Moore, Federal Practice 1656
(Pleading Legal Theory of the Claim) (2 ed. 1948); Commentary, "Pleading of
'Theory of Recovery'," 3 F.R. Serv. 8a,26; Millar, Notabilia of American Civil
Procedure, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1017 (1937); Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial
Court in Historical Perspective 195 (1952); Hubert, Theory of a Case in
Louisiana, 24 Tulane L. Rev. 66 (1949). See Clark, Code Pleading 259-264
(2 ed. 1947): "Necessity of a Theory of Pleadings"; and the ad hominem obser-

vation on p. 233 that "As pointed out later however, in discussing the necessity
of a 'theory of the pleadings,' it should be borne in mind that the pleader's
ultimate theory is that his client should have judgment in his favor, that
these other are but subordinate theories to that end; and a shift in merely
the subordinate theory when the main theory is known will perhaps rarely
be an unfair surprise to the defendant."
111. Simpson, A Possible Solution 'of the Pleading Problem, 53 Harv.

L. Rev. 169 (1939).
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the Federal Rules). It may be considered then, that insofar as
pleadings are concerned, Louisiana will have all of the provisions for liberality provided by the Federal Rules on pleading,
except that Louisiana will retain its present law which requires
the pleading of material facts.
The only area of -difference then is the failure to adopt the
notice system of pleading which is provided by Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules.
The rationale of the arguments against our system of fact
pleading is the problem of variance. The present jurisprudential
rule in Louisiana' (deficiencies in answers excepted), according to the commentary of Professor McMahon to Article 71 of the
projet of the Code Revision, is substantially identical with the
12
end results of that article. Article 71 of the projet provides:
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in
all respects as if they had been raised by the pleadings.
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect
the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected
to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings
to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation
of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby, and
the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense on the merits. The court may grant a
continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such
evidence."
In the provisions of that article lie all the necessary refutation of the arguments against our system of fact pleading. The
8
stalking-horse cases, typified by Buckley v. Mandel Brothers"
would never have been so decided under the regime of a sensible
and benign rule such as Rule 15 of the Federal Rules, or Article
112. See

Louisiana State Law Institute, Preparatory Material, p. 76.

Comments on Article 71.

113. 333 Ill. 368, 164 N.E. 657 (1929), cited in 2 Moore, Federal Practice
1608 (2 ed. 1948).
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71 approved by the Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute,
1 14
or under present jurisprudential rules in Louisiana.
Louisiana, therefore, has paid the Federal Rules the supreme
compliment of adopting in their entirety the rules for the pretrial conference, and discovery and deposition, with little change.
The Council of the Institute is recommending the adoption of
other devices designed to bring simplicity and flexibility to the
rules of pleading-that is, all except the rule which establishes
notice pleading in the federal courts, the adoption of which is
the crux of this discussion.
Conformity between the federal and state courts in matters
of pleading is highly desirable, but it is believed that the notice
system of pleading is not practicable or desirable for the courts
of Louisiana.
The Federal Rules were adopted in 1938, and have been in
effect now for nearly 13 years. In that time the institution of
pre-trial and deposition and discovery has been generally received with approval, except where operation under these provisions has been in a manner not contemplated by the Rules.
But in this 13 year period, few states have adopted the system
of notice pleading of the Federal Rules. Professor McMahon's
paper against fact pleading mentions the case of Texas, where
the attorneys say they plead in the federal courts just as they
do in the state courts. Prominent firms from Ohio, which has
code pleading, give similar information. So it is in Louisiana.
It well may be that lawyers generally continue to plead facts in
the federal courts just as they did before the Rules, because
what constituted good craftsmanship before the Rules, remains
so under the Rules, although they are designed to permit extreme
generality.
Underlying the decision of the Council of the Institute is
the philosophy that he who comes into court and sets in operation the majestic processes of the law against a defendant should
be required to do something more than act on conjecture-he
should bear the burden of pleading a cause of action, as we
understand that phrase in Louisiana. Not only the defendant,
but the court and the public are interested in the prevention of
far-fetched or useless litigation. With discovery before trial to
aid in obtaining necessary information before the institution of
suit, if need be, there is every sound reason to make the require114. Louisiana State Law Institute, Code of Practice Preparatory Material.
Pleading. Henry G. McMahon, Report, March 7 and 8, 1952.
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ment such that the lawyer will be brought to the realization of
the advantages of studying and analyzing his case before he
brings it.
In Louisiana, judges and lawyers by the score, who have
been questioned on the subject, report no dissatisfaction with
the present rules of pleading requiring the pleading of material
facts, which, as has been discussed in this expose, has been with
us ever since the Practice Act of 1805. Our system of pleading
has given general satisfaction and the adoption of pre-trial and
discovery statute is not evidence of dissatisfaction, but merely
of the desire of the legal profession in Louisiana to improve the
system of pleading and practice, where benefit is to be derived
from additions thereto. Discovery is not new in Louisiana. The
Practice Act of 1805 contained provisions for interrogatories for
discovery which were maintained in the Code of Practice until
the adoption of the Discovery Act of 1952.
The decision on this particular point of pleading has been in
the interest of that which is believed to be sound law and good
pleading. It will retain standards of good craftsmanship which
have prevailed in the past, and rules which, with the accessory
and supplementary provisions for pre-trial and discovery, should
insure that there be a just, speedy, inexpensive and final determination of all litigation.
An old gentleman in one of the agricultural parishes in
Louisiana, gave a rural church a deed to some land with this
habendum: "To have and to hold so long as this property shall
be used to combat the damnable teachings of modernism." This
expose has not been written in that spirit, for by modern standards of pleading in our sister states, Louisiana was modern one
hundred and fifty years ago.
The Louisiana State Law Institute has a broad rule which
guides its consideration of problems of law reform and law
revision; it does not hesitate to recommend change where change
is needed, but it will not recommend change just for the sake of
change. Such has been its guide here, and such is the case for
the retention of Louisiana fact pleading.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
POSTSCRIPTUM
Since the above was written the February 1953 advance
sheets of Federal Rules Decisions has been published, containing
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a discussion of "Claim or Cause of Action," to give background
to the recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the Judges
of the Ninth Circuit on September 11, 1952, recommending that
Rule 8 (a) (2) of the Federal Rules be amended so as to read
substantially as follows: "(2) a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, which
statement shall contain the facts constituting a cause of action."
The report of the discussion contains the Report to the Board
of Governors of the State Bar of California of its Committee on
Federal Practice making the same recommendation. This committee report says that "no one knew of instances of denial of
justice under the State of California requirement that a plaintiff
state a cause of action, while in contrast, the committee was
aware of repeated instances of harrassment of defendants who
have been compelled to defend cases where the complaint when
drawn out at considerable trouble and expense, demonstrated
that the complainant did not have, never did have, nor could
have a cause of action entitling him to relief."
The report of a Committee of the Los Angeles Bar Association, appearing as part of the discussion, made the same recommendation. This report contains an expression of the views of
Judge Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chief Justice of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, to the same effect, and quotes him as follows:
"Some of our 'occasional thinkers' have thought me ultraconservative in insisting that a complaint should state, however inartistically, the essentials of a cause of action."
It is significant that this leader at the very forefront of the
movement for the improvement of the judicial administration in
the United States, Chief Justice of a court with unlimited and
unrestricted rule-making power, and his court, have not adopted
the notice pleading of the Federal Rules.
The views of judges and lawyers of a distant sister state
which are identical with the decision of the Council of the Institute, lend great support to the a priori argument made in this
expose des motifs.
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF LOUISIANA LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Dart: Civil Procedure in Louisiana Under the Spanish Regime, 12 La. Historical Q. 22 (1939)
Dart: The Colonial Legal Systems of Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas, 12
A.B.A.J. 481 (1926)
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Dart: Courts and Law in Colonial Louisiana, 22 La. Bar A. Rep. 7 (1921)
Dart: The History of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 133 La. xxx (1913)
Dart: The Influence of the Ancient Law of Spain in the Jurisprudence of
Louisiana
Dart: The Louisiana Judicial System, 1 La. Digest (1937)
Dart: The Place of Civil Law in Louisiana, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 163 (1930)
Dart: The Sources of the Civil Code of Louisiana, 3 La. Bar A. Rep. 21-76
1922 (contains a splendid bibliography)
Gayarre: History of Louisiana (1846)
Groner: Louisiana Law, Its Development in the First Quarter of American
Rule, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 350 (1948)
Howe: Law in the Louisiana Purchase, 14 Yale L.J. 77 (1904)
Martin: History of Louisiana (1882)
Schmidt: Civil Law of Spain and Mexico (1851)
Sherman: Roman Law in the Modern World (1917)
Tucker: Source Books of Louisiana Law, 7 Tulane L. Rev. 82 (1932)
Wenger: The Roman Law of Civil Procedure, 5 Tulane L. Rev. 353 (1931)
(contains an interesting description of the proceedings culminating in
contestato litis, a term frequently used in Louisiana not so many years
ago)
Wigmore: Louisiana: The Story of Its Legal System, 1 So. L.Q. 1 (1916)
For obvious reasons this list is far from inclusive. Enough sources have
been indicated to guide the inquisitive reader to some of the principal writings concerning Louisiana Legal History to which access is not too difficult.
CONCERNING LOUISIANA LAW AND THE FEDERAL RULES

Barrett: Issues of Fact and the Federal Rules, 13 Tulane L. Rev. 105 (1938)
Deutsch: Jury Trials under the Federal Rules and Louisiana Practice, 3
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 422 (1941)
Flory and McMahon: The New Federal Rules and Louisiana Practice, 1
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 45 (1938)
Miller: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 Tulane L. Rev. 99 (1938)
This bibliographical note would not be complete without referring to the
fact that there have been hundreds of cases interpreting the Federal Rules
since their adoption. Shepard's Federal Reporter Citations, Volume 2, 19381953, contains 25 columns of citations to Rule 8 alone. The Federal Rules
Decisions, now on its 13th volume, contains decisions involving procedural
questions, with commentaries on procedural subjects separately included.
The Federal Rules Service, now in its 18th volume, arranges these rules cases
according to the particular rule involved, and in addition contains comments
written expressly for the service, and the republication of law review articles.
In addition to Moore's definitive work on Federal Practice, cited frequently in this expose des motifs, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure (Callaghan), and Federal Practice and Procedure (Rules edition) by Barron and
Holtzoff, assisted by West's Federal Digest, are valuable and encyclopedic
texts which will aid the weary traveler through this "morass" of decisions
interpreting the Federal Rules. In addition, there have been scores of law
review articles, commenting on the Federal Rules.
In this defense of Louisiana fact pleading, it has been necessary to
consult many of these sources, and some are referred to in the notes. No
other listing is required, and this bibliographic note is made in reminiscence
of the application for rehearing made to the Supreme Court of Louisiana by
a fine lawyer from North Louisiana, wherein he said he did not expect the
court to grant him a rehearing but that he earnestly prayed that the court
would add a "per curiam" to the opinion, mentioning a particular case,
because he would not want posterity to think he had failed to call the case
to the court's attention.

